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MAJORITY RIGHTS, MINORITY FREEDOMS: PROTESTANT
CULTURE, PERSONAL AUTONOMY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
Daniel F. Piar*
INTRODUCTION
The landscape of nineteenth-century civil rights law would seem alien to someone
steeped in the concepts of our own time. Bible readings were commonplace in the
public schools; Sunday laws prohibited labor and commerce on the Lord's day; blas-
phemy prosecutions curbed the tongues of those who spoke against religion; and
many of the period's most august lawyers believed that it was the job of the state to
promote Christian morality. From a twenty-first-century perspective, this sort of
environment may seem quaint at best, slightly barbaric at worst. Our age has done
much to separate religion from public institutions, and we now treat as "rights"
conduct that the nineteenth century would never have dreamed of protecting, such
as homosexual relations, abortion, and contraception. We debate "new" rights, such
as the right to die and the right to same-sex marriage, that would have been un-
thinkable in an earlier time. We live in a society in which constitutional rights are
ever-expanding, and in which law is a tool to guard not only our physical freedoms,
but also our more spiritual imperatives - what the Supreme Court has taken to
calling our "concept[s] of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life."' For these reasons, it is tempting to think of modem rights law as
an evolution, in the course of which we have made gains in human dignity and cast
off the constraints of an earlier period. This view is reflected in the judgment of
some scholars that nineteenth-century jurists were unconcerned with individual
rights or too preoccupied with economic matters to worry about personal liberty.2
It is true that the nineteenth-century courts were not nearly as active as those of
the twentieth in defining and expanding civil rights. But this was not the result of
neglect. Rather, it was a product of very different expectations of individuals and
of the law itself, heavily influenced by Protestant individualism and a resultant dis-
tinction between belief and behavior. This article is an attempt to recover the legal
* Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School - Atlanta. J.D., Yale Law
School, A.B., Harvard College.
' Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 504 U.S. at 851).
2 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM iN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 31-32 (4th prtg. 1971); MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE:
PuBLic LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 519 (1977).
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and cultural context of individual liberties in nineteenth-century America and to
explain how it was that the Americans of one age, living under the same set of consti-
tutional principles as we, could differ so dramatically from us in how they honored
those principles. In exploring these questions, I will emphasize three major themes
of this era: Protestant Christianity, majoritarianism, and personal autonomy, which
together gave rise to a distinctive vision of the nature of civil rights and the role of
law in their exercise and enforcement.
The nineteenth century inherited a powerful Protestant tradition. The Puritans,
for instance, had spent generations governing a large portion of America on expressly
Christian principles. Even outside New England, state-established churches were the
rule, not the exception, for most of the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century,
church and state had been officially separated through constitutional guarantees of
freedom of conscience and the formal disestablishment of the state churches. But
Christianity by no means disappeared from public life. Americans remained over-
whelmingly Protestant, and they expressed their religious culture through laws enforc-
ing Protestant standards of behavior. Sunday laws, prayer in schools, and religious
qualifications for public office, to name a few, were manifestations of the Protestant
influence. Laws enforcing religious norms were generally upheld by the courts be-
cause to strike down such laws would be to interfere with the majority's religious
freedoms. Thus, while government could not dictate belief, it could dictate behavior
in the name of the dominant culture, even to those who did not themselves believe.
The tension between this majoritarianism and the religious freedom of minorities
was resolved by a belief in individual moral autonomy. The Protestant tradition had
long emphasized the importance of individual effort in seeking salvation. By the
nineteenth century, this spiritual individualism had evolved into a vision of personal
moral responsibility, in which each person had both the power and the duty to seek
what was morally right. Restraints on conduct, passed into law by the Protestant
majority, could be distinguished from constraints on belief, which remained the
domain of the autonomous individual. In other words, government could control
behavior in the name of religion because the persons being controlled were still free
to believe whatever they wished. Thus, forcing dissenting schoolchildren to stand for
Bible readings did not infringe on the rights of conscience nor did laws forbidding
Jews or Seventh-Day Baptists to work on a day that they did not regard as holy. This
distinction between belief and behavior, now widely, if awkwardly, termed the
"belief/action distinction," was central to the nineteenth-century concept of civil
rights.3 It minimized the role of courts and law in enforcing civil liberties by placing
responsibility for the exercise of conscience on the morally autonomous individual.
' The distinction has survived to a limited extent in modem Free Exercise law. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (applying minimal scrutiny to laws of general
applicability having only an incidental effect on religious practice). In most other contexts, it
has been abandoned by the Supreme Court.
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In modem constitutional law, courts frequently intervene to protect the individual
from state action. The nineteenth-century courts, by contrast, believed that indi-
viduals had both the power and duty to protect themselves. The self, not the law, was
the primary source of personal freedom.
This picture has profound implications both for our understanding of the nine-
teenth century and for our understanding of our own time. The cases discussed in this
article involve freedom of religion, often known as freedom of conscience, which was
at the center of much of the civil rights litigation of the nineteenth century. But in the
twentieth century, the intersection of conscience and law became a fertile ground for
the recognition of a much broader set of autonomy-based rights, including privacy,
sexuality, and the more metaphysical kinds of freedoms defined in Casey and other
decisions. Thus, while a more nuanced view of the nineteenth-century treatment of
conscience illuminates the thought and culture of our past, it also lays the foundation
for a deeper understanding of personal-autonomy rights in our own day.4
I also hope to fill some gaps in modem scholarship concerning the belief/action
distinction and the nineteenth-century treatment of non-economic civil rights. The
belief/action distinction has been roundly criticized by scholars in the context of First
Amendment law.5 This criticism tends to focus on the U.S. Supreme Court's use of
the distinction in the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States to uphold a federal law
banning Mormon polygamy.6 The Court, the argument goes, failed to see that belief
and behavior are not readily separable and that infringements on behavior can
trample civil rights by interfering with the transmission of beliefs to action.7 In
4 I will offer some direct contrasts between the nineteenth- and twentieth-century treat-
ment of rights later in this article, but a full treatment will be forthcoming in a work in
progress.
' For a sustained critique of the distinction as insufficient to protect religious liberty, see
Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIo
ST. L.J. 713 (1993). For other criticisms in the First Amendment context, see W. Cole
Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
665, 712 (1999) (contending that the belief/action distinction is "vacuous in practice");
Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV.
455,500-01 (1991) (stating that the belief/action distinction is "far too blunt a tool for use in
constitutional adjudication"); Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths",
34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 579, 610 (1993) (arguing that the distinction is "well-worn but
largely vacuous"); Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative,
102 HARv.L. REv. 1258, 1261 (1989) (describing the belief/action distinction as "unworkably
rigid").
6 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
' See supra note 5; see also Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U.L. REV. 391,416 n.93 (1987);
Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the
Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1295 (1998).
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addition, some scholars have charged, the belief/action distinction was developed
by the Reynolds Court to justify anti-Mormon bias, which renders it morally suspect
as a way of thinking about rights.8
Whether or not Reynolds was correctly decided, such criticisms miss at least three
important points. First, the belief/action distinction was nothing new in 1878. It had
a long history in the state courts because it had deep roots in American Protestant
culture. Far from being an ad hoc response to a morally and politically touchy set of
facts, it was an expression of a widely shared cultural outlook and so deserves more
sensitive consideration than many scholars have given it. Second, as an expression
of cultural norms, the belief/action distinction has implications beyond the relatively
narrow confines of religious freedom. Although the issue arose most often in a
religious context in the nineteenth century, the courts' response to such claims went
beyond questions of religion to touch on the very concept of civil liberty and what it
meant to exercise rights of any kind in a free society. By looking to individual moral
capacity instead of legal rules as the sources of liberty, the courts were saying some-
thing important not only about religious freedom, but about the relationship between
individual autonomy and the rule of law - namely, that law was not the only source
of freedom or even the most important. This is a very different view of civil rights
than the courts now take, and those scholars who have confined their study of the
issue to the First Amendment have missed an opportunity to broaden our understand-
ing of rights generally in modem times. Finally, when the belief/action distinction
is examined more closely, it can actually be seen as the nineteenth century's way of
honoring its commitment to the freedoms of both majorities and minorities. Because
individual conscience was seen as a sufficient source of personal freedom, the
nineteenth-century courts repeatedly passed up opportunities to expand the defi-
nitions of protected rights through judge-made law. Where majorities trespassed on
express textual provisions, they could be restrained, but the power of individual
conscience meant that there was no need to expand the letter of the law to recognize
unwritten minority rights. To modem eyes, this might look like indifference to rights,
but from the nineteenth century's perspective, it was a way to accommodate the
8 John Delaney, Police Power, Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A
Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REv. 71, 117 (1991) ("The Reynolds belief/action
distinction was driven by a deep-seated, ethnocentric repugnance for polygamy .... ");
Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
563, 575 (1998) (finding it difficult "to accept the Reynolds 'belief/action' distinction as a
principled line"); Todd M. Gillett, Note, The Absolution of Reynolds: The Constitutionality
of Religious Polygamy, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 497, 513 (2000) ("[T]he discussion in
Reynolds mirrored the anti-polygamy sentiment prevalent at the time."); Harmer-Dionne,
supra note 7, at 1309 (arguing that "bias formed the basis of the belief-action distinction.").
One commentator has gone so far as to liken the rule of Reynolds to the notorious pro-slavery
case of Dred Scott v. Sandford. See Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or
Claiming Your Legacy, Justice Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 425, 436 (2003).
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rights of majorities and the freedoms of minorities within the constitutional frame-
work. The nineteenth century thus de-emphasized the role of law as the guardian
of individual liberty and relied far more heavily on individual conscience as a
guarantor of freedom. While we have struck a different balance in our own time
between moral autonomy and the role of law, we should not be quick to condemn
the solutions of another age, especially where, as I hope to show, those solutions
were grounded on a sincere attempt to acknowledge the personal power and dig-
nity of individual conscience - a value that remains a central part of our rights
jurisprudence.
In addition to providing a counterpoint to conventional views of the belief/action
distinction, I hope to build upon some of the historical work that has been done in
illuminating the nature of civil liberties in the nineteenth century. As the foregoing
suggests, this study will focus on non-economic rights and, principally, the rights of
conscience. While a great deal of scholarship has focused on the century's treatment
of economic regulation and the rights of property,9 the non-economic dimensions of
liberty have received less scholarly attention than they deserve. There are a few
notable exceptions. Foremost is Michael Les Benedict's essay, Victorian Moralism
and Civil Liberty in the Nineteenth-Century United States.'° Benedict saw the
nineteenth-century treatment of civil liberties as the product of "Victorian moralism,"
which emphasized "restraint, order, and the transcendence of individual desires" to
support what to modem eyes are restrictive definitions of individual rights." Like
Benedict, I see the legal treatment of rights as an outgrowth of public morality,
though I will place more emphasis than he on both the role of Christianity and the
distinction between the internal and external realms. In another useful study, David
M. Gold used judicial biography to illuminate the nineteenth century's notion of
"responsible individualism,"' 12 a concept that I believe to be an important part of the
century's view of individual moral autonomy. Sarah Barringer Gordon explored the
implications of Protestant culture and the belief/action distinction for the marital rights
of Mormon polygamists. 13 And in a still more focused piece, Thomas James examined
9 See generally HURST, supra note 2; KELLER, supra note 2, at 162-96,343-70; WILLIAM
J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1996); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985);
Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare
State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962).
0 Michael Les Benedict, Victorian Moralism and Civil Liberty in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 91 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992).
" Id. at 92, 103.
12 DAVID M. GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW: JOHN APPLETON AND
RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM (1990).
13 SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
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the consequences of "Protestant cultural hegemony" for the administration of the
century's public schools.' 4 As I hope to show, the Protestant influence extended be-
yond the family and the schools to permeate public life and to influence the culture's
approach to civil rights in a variety of other contexts.
Finally, I have called this a "cultural" study, but more precisely I should call it
a study of the legal culture. A "culture," as I use the term, is a set of shared values,
assumptions, and goals that provide a framework for a group of people to make deci-
sions (conscious or unconscious) about how they will live. In a nation as large and
diverse as the United States, there probably has never been one universal culture, but
there are often broad and influential trends in how people think and act. My focus
here is on what I (and others) call the "legal culture," which consists mainly of judges,
lawyers, and legislators. These are the people who most influence legal decision-
making, and thus it is their assumptions and beliefs that can be considered most im-
portant in trying to understand the law. Not that the legal culture is entirely separate
from that of the society around it. On the contrary, there is considerable interplay
between the two. Jurisprudents are members of society, after all, and they can hardly
help but be influenced by whatever zeitgeist is abroad. For that reason, an under-
standing of the legal culture requires attention to other social forces as well. Some
of these will be explored in this article, though I will rely mainly on legal texts, such
as judicial opinions, state constitutions, and legal treatises, to develop the story.
I. CULTURAL THEMES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW
Three themes related to individual rights stand out in the nineteenth-century
legal culture: Protestantism, majoritarianism, and individual moral autonomy. These
themes combined to form a unique view of individual liberties, one that was
markedly different from what would develop in the twentieth century and beyond.
A. The Protestant Culture
The nineteenth century carried on a long tradition of Protestant influence in national
life. In colonial and Revolutionary times, state-sponsored religion was commonplace
not only in Puritan New England but throughout the emerging nation. Nine of the
original thirteen colonies had state-established churches by the Revolutionary period,
and all of these were Protestant." Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, many statutes, charters, and constitutions expressly promoted Protestantism
and disadvantaged Catholicism by tying suffrage, officeholding, immigration, and
" Thomas James, Rights of Conscience and State School Systems in Nineteenth-Century
America, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTTuTIONS 117, 120 (Paul
Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
11 MARTIN E. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA
36-40 (1970); see also RoBERTT. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANTHOPES AND
HISTORICAL REALITIES 3-26 (1971).
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taxation to religious belief. 16 Formal disestablishment was largely complete by 1800,
though in three states, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Massachusetts, state churches
would persist a few decades longer. 17 But disestablishment did not mean that
Protestantism had lost its hold on society. On the contrary, separation was welcomed
by many who wanted to keep the churches free from interference by the state. 8
Matters of spirituality could only be corrupted by the worldly business of govern-
ment, and many Protestants felt that their religion was strong enough and widespread
enough to thrive without state support. Thus, to a number of believers, disestablish-
ment was a key to the strength of Protestantism, not the loss of a necessary prop.'9
Not that state support was wholly withdrawn in any event. A few states con-
tinued to permit taxation for the support of Protestantism, despite its lack of "official"
status.20 A substantial number retained religious qualifications for public office well
into the nineteenth century,2' and many rendered moral support to the Protestant
cause with language endorsing religion in general, or Christianity in particular, as a
matter of public importance. The Virginia Bill of Rights and Constitution, for
example, contained language from 1776 to 1902 proclaiming that "it is the mutual
duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other. 22
Other constitutions urged that religion was "essential to good government," or
proclaimed the "duty" of all to worship the deity.23 Church and state may have been
formally separate, but they remained intimately connected.24
16 RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE, 1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 7-16, 20-21 (Rinehart & Co., Inc. 1952) (1938).
'7 SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 380 (2d ed.
2004).
18 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERN-
MENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 6 (1965).
19 See AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 381-82 (2d ed. 2004); GORDON, supra note 13, at
71-77; HOWE, supra note 18, at 6-8, 18, 149 (1965); MARTY, supra note 15, at 39; Linda
Przybyszewski, Judicial Conservatism and Protestant Faith: The Case of Justice David J.
Brewer, 91 J. AM. HIST. 471, 477, 480 (2004).
20 MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 111; N.H. CONST.
of 1792, pt. 1, art. VI.
21 ARK CONST. of 1864, art. VIII, § 3; MD. CONST. of 1867, art. XXXVII; MISS. CONST.
of 1890, art. XIV, § 265; N.H. Const. of 1792, §§ XIV, XXIX (effective 1792-1900); N.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 5; PA. CONST. of 1873, art. I, § 4.
22 VA. BILLOFRIGHTS of 1776, § 16; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. 1 (1776); VA. CONST. BILL
OF RIGHTS of 1850, § XVI; VA. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1864, art. I; VA. CONST. of 1870,
art. I, § 18; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. I, § 16.
23 ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 25; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VII, § 1; DEL. CONST.
of 1831, art. I, § 1; KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. I, § 7; NEB. CONST. of 1866-67, art. I, § 16;
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 7; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch.
I, art. III.
2 See generally HANDY, supra note 15, at 3-26; H. Frank Way, The Death of the
Christian Nation: The Judiciary and Church-State Relations, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 509,
510-13 (1987). Historian Linda Przybyszewski offers a review of the historiography of the
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Meanwhile, Americans themselves were overwhelmingly Christian, and over-
whelmingly Protestant. Formal church membership is not the whole story: in the
early part of the century, when official membership was a fairly rigid process, there
was a "huge non-churched majority' 25 who were nonetheless Protestant in belief and
temperament.2 6 But the numbers do help to indicate the Protestant dominance.
While in 1790, Protestant congregations outnumbered Catholic ones by a factor of
seventy-two,27 by 1850, there were only 1.75 million Catholics in the United States.28
Rising immigration meant that those ratios would draw closer by mid-century, 29 but
Protestants remained the clear majority throughout the 1800s. 30 Thus, even after
formal disestablishment, there remained what some historians have called a "de facto
establishment," a general Protestant Christianity that was widely shared and widely
intertwined with government and public life. 3' Nineteenth-century Americans, "by
observation and instinct.., had come to call their territory Protestant.,
32
The concept of general Christianity is important to understanding the Protestant
influence in the nineteenth century. While denominational differences would persist,
American Protestantism in this period became far more homogenized than it had been
before. Much of this stemmed from the liberalizing influence of Enlightenment
thought on American theology.33 Early American Protestantism, even outside New
England, had often promoted Calvinistic themes of natural depravity, predestination,
secularization of the United States following disestablishment, and persuasively argues that
the traditional narrative of an increasingly secular society is incorrect. See Przybyszewski,
supra note 19, at 476-79, 494-96. As she explains, and as the sources gathered in this article
indicate, religion in the nineteenth century was a pervasive influence on law and public life.
See id. For a more detailed analysis of the myth of separation of church and state, and the
reality of the interrelationship of church and state in the nineteenth century, see PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002), especially Chapters 1-10.
Hamburger's book is especially noteworthy for its thesis that religious freedom, not secular-
ism, was the dominant theme in the early nineteenth century and that full separation, con-
ceived as a wall between church and state, was a product of the mid- and late-century growth
of Protestant nativism and individualistic attitudes toward religious and other authority. See
generally id.
25 MARTY, supra note 15,'at 37.
26 HANDY, supra note 15, at 27-28.
27 See MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 166 (2002) (counting 65 Roman Catholic churches out of a total of 4,696 churches).
28 AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 542.
29 See id.
30 See MARTY, supra note 15, at 169, 210.
3' HowE, supra note 18, at 11; MARTY, supra note 15, at 44; see also IRVING H.
BARTLETT, THE AMERICAN MIND IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY 7 (1967); Benedict,
supra note 10, at 98-99; Way, supra note 24, at 509, 513.
32 MARTY, supra note 15, at 16; see also AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 381-82; HOWE,
supra note 18, at 59.
33 See generally AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 343-59.
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eternal punishment, and a kind of frightened moral vigilance. A hallmark of the nine-
teenth century, however, was the softening of these Calvinistic rigors to make the
religious experience less a matter of divine terror than of reason, human capability,
and good feeling. William Ellery Channing launched a direct attack on the old
theology in his 1820 essay, The Moral Argument Against Calvinism.34 Channing
accused Calvinism of disgracing God by underplaying His beneficence and of
disgracing man by underplaying his moral capabilities." "[W]e think it ungrateful
to disparage the powers which our Creator has given us," he wrote. 36 "[T]he earth
is inhabited by rational and moral beings who are authorized to expect from their
Creator the most benevolent and equitable government."37 Channing concluded that
Calvinism "has passed its meridian, and is sinking to rise no more .... Society is
going forward in intelligence and charity, and of course is leaving the theology of
the sixteenth century behind it."3 Bolstering Channing's attack, revivalists such as
Charles Grandison Finney stressed an emotive experience of God, who could now
be approached as part of a group activity in a revival tent instead of in the tortured
confines of one's own soul, as the Calvinists had taught.39 By 1847, Horace Bushnell,
an influential minister and theologian, could speak of an "organic" Christianity, a
natural tendency of man to join with God, without the need for the rigors of the
Puritan conversion experience. ° The Transcendentalist movement took matters still
further, positing the equivalence of man and God and offering an approach to spiritu-
ality that needed little more than the untutored promptings of the soul.41 While
Emerson and his ilk were not in the Protestant mainstream, the popularity of their
teachings was a testament to the growing liberality of Christian thought.42 As
Christianity became more approachable, the result was a "large Protestant consensus'4
3
34 Waiwm ELLERY CHANNING, The Moral Argument Against Calvinism, in UNITARIAN
CHRISTIANITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 39 (Irving H. Bartlett ed., 1957).
35 Id. at 46.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 48.
38 Id. at 58. On Channing's influence generally, see Irving H. Bartlett, Introduction to
CHANNING, supra note 34, at vii-xxx. See also ANDREW DELBANCO, WILLIAM ELLERY
CHANNING: AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERAL SPIRIT IN AMERICA (1981).
3' AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 460; BARTLETr, supra note 31, at 12-14. On Finney's
career and theology generally, see WujAM G. McLOUGHLIN, JR., MODERN REVIVALISM:
CHARLES GRANDISON FINNEY TO BILLY GRAHAM (1959).
40 BARTLETT, supra note 31, at 16-17; see also AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 610-13;
MARTY, supra note 15, at 194.
41 See, e.g., RALPH WALDO EMERSON, An Address: Delivered Before the Senior Class
in Divinity College, Cambridge, July 15, 1838, in NATURE, ADDRESSES, AND LECTURES AND
LETTERS AND SOCIAL AIMs 117, 117-51 (Riverside Press 1929) (1875).
42 BARTLETT, supra note 31, at 8; BARBARA M. CROSS, HORACE BUSHNELL: MINISTER
TO A CHANGING AMERICA 15-19 (1958).
13 AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 381.
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that allowed Americans to commit themselves to the national support of an ecumen-
ical, general Christianity. A dual process was at work: "Protestantism itself was
being Americanized, and nineteenth-century America was becoming a Protestant
civilization."44
Law did not escape the influence of the general Protestant culture. Sarah Gordon
has observed that, in the nineteenth century, "secular law fit comfortably within
central Protestant tenets,"'45 and indeed the legal establishment spoke openly of the
need to acknowledge the place of general Christianity in the life and laws of
America. As one state court explained in 1824, "Christianity, general Christianity,
is and always has been a part of the common law of Pennsylvania... not Christianity
founded on any particular religious tenets; not Christianity with an established
church, and tithes, and spiritual courts; but Christianity with liberty of conscience
to all men."46 Daniel Webster, arguing before the Supreme Court twenty years later,
used virtually the same terms: "All, all proclaim that Christianity, general, tolerant
Christianity, Christianity independent of sects and parties, that Christianity to which
the sword and the fagot are unknown.., is the law of the land. 47 One could speak
of Christianity divorced from "particular religious tenets" precisely because Christian
belief was so widespread. In the words of a popular mid-century author, it was "the
very atmosphere in which our institutions exist," and the "cement by which they are
bound together., 41 Sects, denominations, and other religious formalities were merely
elaborations on this fundamental cultural theme.
The century's legal commentators endorsed the view that Christianity was closely
allied with American law. At the most mundane level, the influence of Christianity
was important to the process of workaday adjudication in a common-law society.
Joseph Story was typical in viewing Christianity as "a part of the Common Law,
from which it seeks the sanction of its rights, and by which it endeavours to regulate
its doctrines."49 The century's other great constitutional scholar, Thomas Cooley,
44 D.H. MEYER, THE INSTRUCTED CONSCIENCE: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
NATIONAL ETHIC 25 (1972).
41 GORDON, supra note 13, at 231.
46 Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 400 (Pa. 1824).
41 6 DANiEL WEBSTER, THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 176 (Boston, Little Brown &
Co. 20th ed. 1890). The case was Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127 (1844). A trun-
cated version of Webster's statement appears in the official reports. Id. at 177-78.
48 STEPHEN COLWELL, THE POSITION OF CHRISTIANrrY IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (photo.
reprint 1972) (1854).
41 Joseph Story, Discourse Pronounced Upon the Inauguration of the Author, as Dane
Professor of Law in Harvard University, August 25th, 1829, in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA:
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 176,178 (Perry Miller ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1969)
(1962) [hereinafter THE LEGAL MIND]; see also HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 390-91 (1895); THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 225 (3d ed. 1898)
(1880); HOWE, supra note 18, at 27-28 (discussing Jefferson's view that Christianity is not
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likewise believed that "[q]uestions of public policy, as they arise in the common law,
must always be largely dependent upon the prevailing system of public morals, and
the public morals upon the prevailing religious belief."' But beyond the court system,
there was a sense that Christianity should be a special concern of American govern-
ment. Story called the Christian religion "the only solid basis of civil society,"'" and
he urged that "it is impossible for those, who believe in the truth of Christianity, as a
divine revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of government to foster, and
encourage it among all the citizens and subjects."52 While Story believed in freedom
of conscience, he also believed that it was no constitutional violation for government
to encourage Christianity:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of
the [first] amendment to it... the general, if not the universal,
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive en-
couragement from the state, so far as it is not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious
worship. 3
Like Story, Cooley believed that "the prevailing religion of the country is Christian,"'
and he, too, thought that government should foster Christian sensibilities:
The moral sense is measurably regulated and controlled by the
religious belief; and therefore it is that those things which, esti-
mated by a Christian standard, are profane and blasphemous are
properly punished as offences, since they are offensive in the
highest degree to the general public sense, and have a direct ten-
dency to undermine the moral support of the laws and corrupt
the community.5
a part of common law - a view differing from most court cases); JOHN ORDRONAUX,
CONSTITrUONAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS ORIGIN, AND APPLICATION TO THE
RELATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS AND OF STATE LEGISLATURES 235 (1891).
SO COOLEY, supra note 49, at 226-27.
5' Story, supra note 49, at 186.
52 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 699
(Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833).
11 Id. at 700.
54 CoOLEY, supra note 49, at 226.
55 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OFTHE STATES OFTHE AMERICAN UNION 471 (Da Capo Press
1972) (1868).
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Henry Black (of law dictionary fame) wrote that "the laws are to recognize the exis-
tence of that [Christian] system of faith, and our institutions are to be based on that
assumption."56 And another treatise writer, John Ordronaux, called Christianity "the
standard code of orthodoxy by which the national conscience seeks to guide itself."
57
The treatise-writers were joined by the judges, who time and again acknowledged,
argued, or declared that American society was Christian. A few examples, out of many
that could be cited, will suggest the pervasiveness of such views. Chancellor Kent of
New York, affirming a conviction for blasphemy in 1811, wrote that "[t]he people of
this state, in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of
christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice."58 The Supreme Court of Texas
remarked fifty years later that "[t]he vast majority of our people profess a belief in the
Christian religion," 59 while that of Pennsylvania described the state as "a community,
the vast majority of whom are Christians."'6° The Missouri Supreme Court professed
at mid-century that "our constitution was framed for a people whose religion was
christianity.",6 ' Even the United States Supreme Court eventually joined the chorus,
with Justice David Brewer's famous 1892 pronouncement that "this is a Christian
nation. 6 2 The de facto establishment was thriving, and the legal culture embraced it.
B. Majoritarianism
A second theme of the nineteenth-century legal culture was majoritarianism, which
embraced three major concepts: majority rule, majority rights, and the subordination
of the individual to the whole. In part, majoritarianism encompassed the standard
view that a democratic republic must be governed by greatest numbers. One legal com-
mentator pragmatically (if glibly) noted that "if the majority did not govern, nothing
could govern; and if there were no government, there could be no social order, no
organized community. 63 Majoritarian lawmaking, such as legislation, was generally
looked upon with favor. James Madison Porter, a prominent Pennsylvania lawyer,
asserted the primacy of the many in an 1828 essay on the common law: "The legislator
56 BLACK, supra note 49, at 391.
57 ORDRONAUX, supra note 49, at 235.
58 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
59 Gabel v. City of Houston, 29 Tex. 335, 345 (1867).
0 Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322 (1848).
61 State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214, 218-19 (1854).
62 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,471 (1892). For a study of
the context and significance of Brewer's statement, see Steven K. Green, Justice David Josiah
Brewer and the "Christian Nation" Maxim, 63 ALB. L. REV. 427 (1999). For an overview of
the role of Protestantism in the lives and thoughts of Justice Brewer and other late nineteenth-
century jurists, see Przybyszewski, supra note 19.
63 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE PoLrrICAL, PERSONAL, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS OF A Cn
OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (photo. reprint 2004) (1875).
[Vol. 14:987
MAJoRrrY RIGHTS, MINORITY FREEDOMS
is free. No decree from a higher authority, except it be the letter and the spirit of the
Constitution, has any restrictive force over his measures. ' 64 The courts, by and
large, agreed. The popular image of the nineteenth century as a period of laissez-
faire, in which antimajoritarian judges restrained legislatures by striking down
economic regulation, is exaggerated. Perhaps the Supreme Court of the 1890s better
fit the stereotype, but for most of the century, legislative regulation of the economy
was profuse and was more often than not upheld by the courts.65 Even private
property, often considered a bulwark of individual liberty, was consistently subject
to takings and other kinds of regulation for the good of the whole.' In 1889, one
observer, reviewing the Supreme Court's then-recent Fourteenth Amendment cases,
remarked with approval that the Court "has merely given the benefit of the doubt to
the State, rather than to the individual; to the people, rather than to the person.
67
The concept of majority rule was often invoked in litigation over individual liber-
ties. The bulk of the century's civil rights cases were claims brought by minorities
with whose freedoms the majority was interfering. Jews and Seventh-Day Baptists
sought relief from Sunday laws; Catholics tried to purge the public schools of the
King James Bible; nonbelievers challenged blasphemy laws. In nearly all of these
cases, the courts affirmed the right of the majority qua majority to have its way. In
Donahoe v. Richards, an influential Bible-reading case from Maine, a Catholic girl
challenged her expulsion from school for refusing to read the prescribed King James
Bible.68 The state supreme court upheld the expulsion, in part because it viewed the
claim to minority rights as anarchic:
4 James Madison Porter, Review of "Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the
Circuit Court of the United States, for the Second Circuit", in THE LEGAL MIND, supra note
49, at 160, 163.
65 In a recent study, William J. Novak illustrates the pervasiveness of regulation through-
out the nineteenth century in areas as diverse as fire safety, public spaces, temperance, public
health, and the market economy. See generally NOVAK, supra note 9. Novak's work is
valuable in further debunking the myth of laissez-faire and in showing how willing the
nineteenth century was to hand over regulatory power to government. See generally id. See
also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONsTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 448-49 (1985); HURST, supra note 2, at 32,50-51; KELLER, supra note
2, at 162-81; Albert S. Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate
Transportation Facilities, 25 N.C. L. REV. 121 (1947).
66 See HURST, supra note 2, at 26-28. Other examples of regulation collected by Hurst
include bankruptcy laws, court rulings leaving the taxing and police powers free from con-
straint by the Contracts Clause, and the pro-public construction of public grants, as in
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). See HURST, supra note
2, at 26-28.
67 A.H. Wintersteen, The Sovereign State, 37 AM. L. REG. 129, 139 (1889).
68 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854).
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The right as claimed, undermines the power of the State. It
is, that the will of the majority shall bow to the conscience of the
minority, or of one. If the several consciences of the scholars are
permitted to contravene, obstruct or annul the action of the State,
then power ceases to reside in majorities, and is transferred to
minorities.69
In a similar Texas case, the court rejected a challenge to Bible-reading brought by
Catholic and Jewish parents because to give these minorities their way "would be
to starve the moral and spiritual natures of the many out of deference to the few."'7
In State v. Chandler,7' a Delaware blasphemy prosecution, the court explained that
Christianity could command the respect of the courts not only because of its truth,
but also because of the majority's desires:
[T]he people of Delaware have a full and perfect constitutional
right to change their religion as often as they see fit. They may to-
morrow, if they think it right, profess Mahometanism or Judaism,
or adopt any other religious creed they please. .. [Wihen that
distant day shall arive [sic] (if come it must) in which the people
shall forsake the faith of their forefathers for such miserable
delusions, no human power can restrain them from compelling
every man who lives among them to respect their feelings....
[B]lasphemy against [Christianity] is punishable, while the people
prefer it as their religion, and no longer.72
Majorities, then, possessed inherent authority to govern in the name of their beliefs,
whatever those beliefs might be.
But the wide scope given to majorities was not merely a function of raw numer-
ical power. It was also a function of the majority's collective individual rights.
While minority rights were protected to some degree, often by express constitutional
language, it was a central premise of the time that the freedoms of the few could be
understood only in connection with the rights and freedoms of the many.73 The
69 Id. at 409.
70 Church v. Bullock, 109 S.W. 115, 118 (Tex. 1908).
71 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837).
72 Id. at 567-68, 571, 572.
7 Barry Alan Shain has identified a similar outlook in what he calls the "reformed Protestant
and communal" politics of eighteenth-century America. BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF
AMERICAN INDIVIDUAISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLmcAL THOUGHT 4
(1994). According to Shain, eighteenth-century Americans were less individualistic than they are
often portrayed and more committed to a Christian model of the public good that required the
subordination of selfish interests to the benefit of the whole. Shahn suggests that this model was
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Supreme Court captured this spirit in the Charles River Bridge case, holding that a
vested property right could be modified for the public weal: "While the rights of
private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also
have rights, and that the happiness and well being of every citizen depends on their
faithful preservation."74 The same concerns applied to claims of non-economic rights.
Rights of conscience or religious freedom, "like every other right, must be exercised
with strict regard to the equal rights of others,"75 and could only be enjoyed "in reason-
able subserviency... to the paramount interests of the public. 76
As these quotations suggest, an important corollary to the majority-rights prin-
ciple was the subordination of the individual to the whole. John Pomeroy, in his
constitutional law treatise, exhorted the citizen to remember that "[s]econd only to
his duty to God, stands that to his country; the welfare of the body-politic has a
stronger claim upon him than even that of family or of self.",77 His contemporary
Theophilus Parsons likened the body politic to a family and explained "that the
family may be happy, each individual member gives up somewhat of his or her own
mere will and pleasure. 78 Black took pains to point out that personal liberty "is
limited, in accordance with law, in so far as may be necessary for the preservation of
the state and the due discharge of its functions. '79 This belief was also reflected in
many state constitutions. It was common for guarantees of religious freedom to be
qualified by statements that religious license could not be allowed to disturb unduly
the community. New Hampshire's constitution was typical: "Every individual has a
natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience.., provided he doth not disturb the public peace or disturb others in their
religious worship."80 Other states followed suit, cautioning that liberty could not
challenged by the rise of Romanticism and other forms of individualism in the early nineteenth
century, but he notes that communalism continued even in the face of such challenges. See id.
at 81-83, 113-15, 149-50. My view, that Shain's "reformed Protestant communalism" persisted
in the law well into the nineteenth century, is both supported by the sources and consistent with
the unsurprising notion that the pace of cultural change among the lawyering classes tends to be
conservative and slow rather than rapid. The constitutional law of individual rights did not
become fully Romantic until the mid- to late twentieth century, as I hope to illustrate in a sequel
to this article. See also NOVAK, supra note 9, at 11 (discussing the harmony of freedom and
regulation).
" Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 420, 548 (1837).
7' Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. Ch. 548, 561 (N.Y. Ch. 1861) (upholding a convic-
tion for operating a theater on Sunday).
76 Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 467 (1876) (upholding the expulsion of Catholic school-
children for attending church on a school day).
77 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 17 (4th ed. 1879).
78 PARSONS, supra note 63, at 41.
79 BLACK, supra note 40, at 397.
80 N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 1, art. V.
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"excuse acts of licentiousness,"8' nor justify "pernicious practices, inconsistent with
morality. 8 2 By 1943, things had changed so much that Justice Robert Jackson could
trace American constitutionalism to the premise "that the individual was the center
of society. '8 3 But such a phrase would have sounded strange to most nineteenth-
century lawyers. Individual responsibility was part and parcel of individual freedom.84
The strength of majority rule, combined with the majority's commitment to
Christianity, raised a problem of minority rights. How should a majoritarian society
treat those who did not share the majority's faith? The Enlightenment and the
Revolution had made it impossible for government to enforce belief as it had in the
Puritan era, and the diversity (and sometimes the contentiousness) of the American
populace made it impractical to do so in any event.8 5 It is a measure of the era's
pragmatism - and its commitment to individual liberty - that an ostensibly clear
answer was provided: there must be complete freedom of belief. In this the consti-
tutions, the commentators, and the judges were in accord. Typical of many state
constitutions was Pennsylvania's: "[A]ll men have a natural and indefeasible right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences...
[and] no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience ... ,86 Both Story and Cooley spoke for the scholars in
condemning attempts to dictate belief as opposed to regulating behavior:
[Tihe duty of supporting religion, and especially the Christian reli-
gion, is very different from the right to force the consciences of
other men, or to punish them for worshipping God in the manner,
which, they believe, their accountability to him requires.... The
rights of conscience are, indeed, beyond the just reach of any
human power."
81 GA. CONST. of 1868, art. 1, § 6.
82 IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 4. For other examples of such qualifications, see ME.
CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 36; MASS. CONST.
of 1780, pt. 1, art. II; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 3;
MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 4; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 3; N.D. CONST. of 1889, art.
I, § 4; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 9.
83 W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
84 See Michael Les Benedict, Foreword to GOLD, supra note 12; see also GOLD, supra
note 12, at 82, 169; HURST, supra note 2, at 26-28; Benedict, supra note 10, at 103-04.
85 AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 379-80; MARTY, supra note 15, at 35-43.
86 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3. For other similarly broad statements, see ARK. CONST.
of 1864, art. II, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 3; KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 3; N.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 26.
87 Story, supra note 49, at 700-01. See also COOLEY, supra note 49, at 469-70 ("No
external authority is to place itself between the finite being and the Infinite, when the former
is seeking to render that homage which is due....").
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Judges agreed, as typified by the Massachusetts Supreme Court: "Any attempt, by
legislation, to control or dictate the belief of individuals, is so impracticable, so per-
fectly futile, as to show at once, how entirely above all civil authority are the oper-
ations of the human mind, especially in the adoption of its religious faith."88
While minorities were thus protected on paper, in practice things were not so clear.
Nineteenth-century judges, unlike those of the twentieth, did not strain to expand
constitutional texts to encompass previously unrecognized rights. Minority protec-
tions were to be enforced as they appeared, without attention to their penumbras or
emanations or other unwritten aspects. While it was therefore easy for nineteenth-
century judges to disallow obvious violations of minority rights,89 in the less flagrant
cases their instincts usually went counter to our own. Dissenting schoolchildren
could be forced to stand for Bible readings in class; protections of free speech and
free belief were not extended to blasphemy; and Jews could be forced to close their
shops on Sundays because their working was unacceptable to the Christian majority. 9°
In modem times, we have reached a stage where even these less blatant forms of state
control are considered unacceptable infringements on belief.9' To the nineteenth-
century mind, however, such controls on behavior did not trespass on the protected
realm of individual conscience. Central to this understanding was the century's con-
cept of individual moral autonomy.
C. Moral Autonomy, the Belief/Action Distinction, and the Role of Law
The nineteenth century viewed the individual as an independent moral agent,
both capable of and responsible for choosing what was right. This was in part an
inheritance from Puritanism and other strains of Calvinist Protestantism, which had
88 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206,235 (1838). See also McGatrick
v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566, 571 (1855) ("[N]o power whatever is possessed by the legislature
over things spiritual, but only over things temporal .... ").
89 See, e.g., Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 403 (1854) (noting that the state consti-
tution would "prevent pains and penalties, imprisonment or the deprivation of social or
political rights, being imposed as a penalty for religious professions and opinions"); Specht
v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322 (1848) ("No man ... can be coerced to profess any form
of religious belief, or to practise any peculiar mode of worship, in preference to another.");
Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 465 (1876) (noting that the state constitution was designed to
"secure to every subject equal civil rights, irrespective of his religious faith; so that his being
a Catholic or a Protestant... should not make him the object of discriminating legislation
orjudicial judgment to his disadvantage, as compared with those of different faith and practice").
90 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
9' See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down prayer at a school's
graduation); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding a Maryland Sunday
closing law but noting that the law now serves secular rather than religious purposes); State
v. West, 263 A.2d 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (overturning a Maryland blasphemy law
as a violation of the First Amendment).
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made salvation dependent on the individual's internal experience of grace. Entering
a personal relationship with God was of paramount importance, and this required
constant self-observation in the quest for indications of the Spirit within. In this
process each man became, if not an island, then at least a responsible party where his
own salvation was concerned. At the same time, however, the Calvinist doctrines of
predestination and natural depravity taught that man was limited in what he could
hope to accomplish, thereby imposing the burden of spiritual responsibility while to
some extent denying man the moral tools to carry out his charge.
This dilemma was resolved for the nineteenth century by the softening of
Calvinism discussed above. The emergent general Christianity saw man as respon-
sible for himself but also as capable of discerning the right and acting accordingly.
Channing exemplified the new hopefulness in "Unitarian Christianity," his famous
1819 sermon:
We believe that all virtue has its foundation in the moral nature of
man, that is, in conscience or his sense of duty, and in the power
of forming his temper and life according to conscience. We be-
lieve that these moral faculties are the grounds of responsibility
and the highest distinctions of human nature, and that no act is
praiseworthy any further than it springs from their exertion.92
The great error of Calvinism, by contrast, was its failure to endorse "the confidence
which is due to our rational and moral faculties in religion.93 Other religious leaders
bolstered this theme. Timothy Dwight and Nathaniel William Taylor, who spear-
headed the optimistic New Haven Theology, emphasized "man's moral and intel-
lectual agency,' 94 and taught that all had the freedom to choose the right and to avoid
sin.95 The revivalist Finney likewise preached that sin was a choice, not an inevitable
natural condition, and all could seek the good through conscious moral decision-
making.96 Man was no longer the victim of the overbearing will of a predestining
God; instead, he was capable of making the kinds ofjudgments and choices that could
lead him to virtue and happiness. Predestination was out; self-regulation was in.
This view of man as both morally capable and morally responsible influenced
nineteenth-century society in ways beyond theology. It showed in the rise of reform
movements dedicated to the suppression of vice and the improvement of human be-
ings, a movement which Calvin Woodard has called "probably the greatest character
92 WiLLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, Unitarian Christianity: Discourse at the Ordination of
the Rev. Jared Sparks, Baltimore, 1819, in CHANNING, supra note 34, at 3, 30.
93 CHANNING, supra note 34, at 46 (emphasis in original).
94 AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 419.
95 Id. at 418-20; see also NOLL, supra note 27, at 278-80, 290, 314-16.
96 AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at 460.
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building program of all times. 97 It led to the adoption in many colleges of a senior-
year course in moral philosophy, designed to cap an undergraduate career by equip-
ping students for moral thought and action. 98 It promoted the equation of wealth
with virtue and poverty with vice, attributing to moral character conditions that we
now tend to ascribe to market forces. 99 Self-control, as historians have observed,
was a fundamental tenet of nineteenth-century morality.'0°
The belief in moral autonomy resonated in the law as well. Tort doctrines such
as contributory negligence and the fellow-servant rule limited one's right to recover
where one's own choices had played a role in the injury.'" An insistence on mens
rea in criminal cases reinforced notions of moral accountability.' 2 Where laws came
into conflict with personal beliefs, the nineteenth century did not assume, as ours
often does, that law must yield. Rather, the individual must choose. In the words
of one prominent judge: "When a conflict arises, as it may, between the require-
ments of law and the obligations of conscience, each man must determine his course
of action according to his views of duty and of right."'0 3
In the area of individual rights, the concept of autonomy led to an important dis-
tinction between external behavior and internal belief. Cooley summarized the dichot-
omy: It is the province of the state "to enforce the obligations and duties which the
citizen may owe to his fellow-citizen, but those which he owes to his Maker are to
be enforced by the admonitions of the conscience, and not by the penalties of human
laws."'' Where law was concerned, a boundary was marked between the regulation
of human activity and the regulation of personal belief. While this distinction may
have kept law from forcing conscience, it also gave majorities a great deal of latitude.
For if action was separate from belief, then it followed that government could
regulate the former without trespassing on the latter. As John Burgess explained in
a nineteenth-century treatise:
The free exercise of religion secured by the constitution. . . is,
therefore, confined to the realm of purely spiritual worship; i.e.,
to relations between the individual and an extra-mundane being.
9' Woodard, supra note 9, at 299. See also AHLSTROM, supra note 17, at422-28; BARI=,
supra note 31, at 42; KELLER, supra note 2, at 122-31 (discussing social reform for criminals,
the poor, public health, and temperance).
98 See generally MEYER, supra note 44.
99 Benedict, supra note 10, at 97; Woodard, supra note 9, at 291-93, 298-99, 316-18.
'0o Benedict, supra note 10, at 93-95, 103; Przybyszewski, supra note 19, at 489-91; see
also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTALJUSTICE 133 (1985); LAWRENCE FREDERICK KOHL, THE
POLmcs OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN
ERA 151-53 (1989); MEYER, supra note 44, at 68.
'0' FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 52-63; Benedict, supra note 10, at 103-04.
102 HURST, supra note 2, at 18-19; Przybyszewski, supra note 19, at 491-94.
i03 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 412 (1854).
'04 COOLEY, supra note 49, at 469.
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So soon as religion seeks to regulate relations between two or more
individuals, it becomes subject to the powers of the government
and to the supremacy of the law; i.e., the individual has in this case
no constitutional immunity against governmental interference."5
The U.S. Supreme Court made the same point in Reynolds v. United States, uphold-
ing a federal law forbidding polygamy:
[W]hile [laws] cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opin-
ions, they may with practices.... To permit [otherwise] would be
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under
such circumstances."0 6
The distinction between internal beliefs and external behavior solved the problem
of protecting minorities while preserving majority rule. Dissenters remained free
on the inside, even as their outward activities were being regulated or penalized.
The belief/action distinction also served to de-emphasize the role of law in polic-
ing individual freedom. Barry Alan Shain has made the point with respect to the
eighteenth-century Protestant consensus: "Most Americans' understanding of human
fulfillment was not intrinsically linked to political life. Most who concerned them-
selves with such questions held instead that politics was of instrumental importance,
and that human fulfillment could only be achieved through surrender to Christ and
the intercession of God's grace."' 07 In other words, true freedom was found within,
not in the external structures of law or government. A similar view was carried
forward into the nineteenth-century legal culture, as Lawrence Friedman has noted
in explaining the era's sometimes lax policing of vice: "The nineteenth century...
relied on self-control, which it tried to support through legal institutions, as well as
other social processes. The enforcement power of law was used rather sparingly;
law was unnecessary for most people, who were, after all, quite successful in con-
trolling themselves."'' 08 It was not that the Victorians ignored the problems of vice,
but they had social tools other than law for protecting public values. The same
phenomenon accounts for the century's seemingly lax approach to non-economic
individual rights. It was not that the age was indifferent to such rights - its written
105 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
194-95 (1893).
'0' Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). For an analysis of the Reynolds
Court's use of the belief/action distinction, see GORDON, supra note 13, at 132-35. See also
supra notes 5, 7-8 (citing sources that criticize Reynolds).
07 SHAIN, supra note 73, at 320.
108 FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 133. See also KOHL, supra note 100, at 151.
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laws and judicial rhetoric belie such a view. But the commitment to the Protestant
culture, combined with the belief in the moral autonomy of dissenters, meant that
conflicts between majorities and minorities were to be resolved by means other than
the imposition of new rules of law. Timothy Walker, a prot6g6 of Story and the
author of a prominent legal textbook, summarized the limits of law and the glories
of conscience in an 1837 lecture:
They commit an egregious error, who consider jurisprudence as
looking forward into eternity. It begins and ends with this world.
It regards men only as members of civil society. It assists to
conduct them from the cradle to the grave, as social beings; and
there it leaves them to their final Judge.... Religion and moral-
ity embrace both time and eternity in their mighty grasp; but
human laws reach not beyond the boundaries of time. As im-
mortal beings, they leave men to their conscience and their God.
And though this consideration may seem, at first view, to detract
from their dignity, I rejoice at it as a consequence of our absolute
moral freedom."°9
Walker's words capture perfectly the relationship between moral autonomy and the
limited role of law. Worldly matters, including codes of social behavior, were the
domain of law; matters eternal, including the exercise of conscience, were beyond
law's sphere. The separation of the internal and the external, the spiritual and the tem-
poral, was a way to respect the rights of majorities while honoring the individual's
moral faculties. The battles between orthodoxy and dissent were to be fought not
in the courts, but in the realm of politics, personal morality, and individual choice.
II. LAW, CULTURE, AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Once the main themes of nineteenth-century legal culture are understood, it be-
comes possible to appreciate the century's approach to individual rights on its own
terms. As these themes influenced concrete cases, they gave shape to a vision of the
role of law that by modern standards is limited, but which by nineteenth-century
standards struck the appropriate balance between majority rights and minority
freedoms. As we shall see, time and again, from a twenty-first century perspective,
the courts refused to intervene to protect minorities. But we react that way because
we have been conditioned to expect a great deal from law; the nineteenth century
could act as it did because much of what we now expect from the courts it expected
from the interplay of the majority culture and the autonomous individual.
109 Timothy Walker, Introductory Lecture on the Dignity of the Law as a Profession,
Delivered at the Cincinnati College, November 4, 1837, in THE LEGALMIND, supra note 49,
at 238, 240-41.
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A. Sunday Laws
Litigation over Sunday laws provided some of the century's earliest court battles
between the claims of individual conscience and the will of the majority. The laws
of most states prohibited various activities on Sunday, from the performance of labor
to the sale of goods to the formation of contracts."0 Litigation typically arose when
non-Christians violated these statutes or sought to be excused from them. Courts
almost universally upheld the laws"' and, in doing so, brought the themes of Protes-
tantism, majoritarianism, and personal autonomy to bear on the resolution of partic-
ular claims of right.
One of the earliest reported Sunday-law cases, Commonwealth v. Wolf,"2 was
typical of such claims. Wolf, a Jewish resident of Philadelphia, was convicted and
fined for unlawfully performing "worldly employment" on a Sunday.' On appeal,
Wolf attacked the statute under Article 9, Section 3 of the state constitution, which
provided that "No human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere
with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any
religious establishments or modes of worship."' 4 Wolf relied on two main arguments,
which were typical of those raised in Sunday-law cases throughout the century. First,
he contended that his religion regarded Saturdays as holy and required the perfor-
mance of work on the other six days of the week." 5 Thus, Sunday laws disadvan-
taged Jews by effectively permitting them to work on only five out of seven days.
Second, Wolf argued that being forced to keep the Christian Sabbath could violate
the rights of conscience of non-Christians by compelling an act of piety in which they
did not believe."16
In rejecting Wolf s claim and others like it, the courts expressed several rationales
for upholding the Sunday laws. One of these was the need to defer to the choices of
the Christian majority. Sabbath-breaking was an affront to majority preferences, as
the Wolf court explained:
"' For a general history and overview of Sunday laws, see DAVID N. LABAND & DEBORAH
HENDRY HEINBUCH, BLUE LAWS: THE HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS OF SUNDAY-
CLOSING LAWS (1987).
"I A conspicuous exception was Ex Parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858), in which the
California Supreme Court overturned the state's Sunday law because it impermissibly favored
Christianity over other religions. However, the same court reached the opposite conclusion just
three years later in Ex Parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 (1861).
i12 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817).
113 Id.
"' Id. at 48.
115 id.
116 Id.
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The invaluable privilege of the rights of conscience, secured to us
by the constitution of the Commonwealth, was never intended to
shelter those persons, who, out of mere caprice, would directly
oppose those laws, for the pleasure of showing their contempt
and abhorrence of the religious opinions of the great mass of the
citizens." 7
Equally protective was the Arkansas Supreme Court, some thirty years after
Wolf, upholding a conviction for selling groceries on a Sunday:
By reserving to every individual the sacred and indefeasible rights
of conscience, the [constitutional) convention most certainly did
not intend to leave it in his power to do such acts as are ... neces-
sarily calculated to bring into contempt the most venerable and
sacred institutions of the country. Sunday or the Sabbath is prop-
erly and emphatically called the Lord's day, and is one amongst
the first and most sacred institutions of the christian religion....
[It] can rightfully claim the protection of the law-making power
of the State."'
Likewise, the Alabama Supreme Court, construing that state's Sunday law in a
contract dispute, noted with approval that "the design of the Legislature" was "evi-
dently to promote morality and advance the interests of religion."" 9 The majority
was entitled to protect its preferred religion, and minorities would not be allowed to
call that choice into question.
The protection of Christianity was not merely a matter of majority fiat; it was
also a matter of the majority's individual rights. Nonbelievers' rights of conscience,
"like every other right, must be exercised with strict regard to the equal rights of
others."'2 ° One such right, enjoyed by members of the majority, was the right to
worship unmolested by the activity of nonbelievers. Without Sunday laws, "[h]ow
could those who conscientiously believe that Sunday is hallowed time, to be devoted
to the worship of God, enjoy themselves in its observance amidst all the turmoil and
bustle of worldly pursuits, amidst scenes by which the day was desecrated, which
they conscientiously believed to be holy?"'121 In order to protect "those who desire
"' Id. at 51.
118 Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 262-63 (1850).
"9 O'Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 467, 469 (1843).
120 Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548, 561 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861) (upholding a con-
viction for holding a theatrical performance on a Sunday).
121 State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214, 218 (1854). Similar language appears in Gabel v. City of
Houston, 29 Tex. 335, 346 (1867).
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and are entitled to the day,"' 122 the law could forbid activities that might "interfere
with the rights of those who choose to assemble for public worship.' 23 Thus, the
Sunday laws were a means of promoting liberty, not restraining it; "so far from affec-
ting religious freedom, [they are] a means by which the rights of conscience are
enjoyed.' 24 The majority's religious freedom could not be sacrificed to minority
desires.
The pleas of the dissenters were further weakened by the legal culture's belief
in personal autonomy. Minorities did not need to strike down the majority's laws
to be free because they enjoyed complete internal freedom of conscience regardless
of the restraints imposed on their external behavior. In City Council of Charleston
v. Benjamin, 12 for example, a Jewish merchant was convicted for selling clothing
on a Sunday.126 He claimed in his defense that being required to observe the Christian
Sabbath violated his rights of conscience.127 The court did not dispute that Benjamin
was entitled to absolute freedom of belief, but it denied that any such rights had
been violated. 128 Benjamin was being forced only to behave in a certain way, not
to subscribe to any particular creed:
But it is said this [Sunday law] violates the free exercise and
enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of the Israelite.
Why? It does not require him to desecrate his own Sabbath. It
does not say, you must worship God on the Christian Sabbath.
On the contrary, it leaves him free on all these matters. His eve-
ning sacrifice and his morning worship, constituting the 7th day,
he publicly and freely offers up, and there is none to make him
afraid. His Sundays are spent as he pleases, so far as religion is
concerned. No one dare say to him, in the circle of his own fire-
side, what doest thou? None, as he walks the street, would dare
say to him, turn in hither, and worship as we do!
It is however fancied that in some way this law is in dero-
gation of the Hebrew's religion, inasmuch as by his faith and
this Statute, he is compelled to keep two Sabbaths. There is the
122 Lindenmuller, 33 Barb. at 568.
23 Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 102, 115 (1853). Some states supplemented their
Sunday laws with laws specifically prohibiting the disturbance of public worship. See, e.g.,
State v. Bledsoe, 1 S.W. 149 (Ark. 1886); State v. Edwards, 32 Mo. 548 (1862); State v. Jasper,
15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 323 (1833); Cockreham v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 11 (1846); Kindred v.
State, 33 Tex. 67 (1870).
" Ambs, 20 Mo. at 218.
125 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508 (S.C. Ct. App. 1848).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 527.
128 Id.
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mistake. He has his own, free and undiminished! Sunday is to
us our day of rest. We say to him, simply, respect us, by ceasing
on this day from the pursuit of that trade and business in which
you, by the security and protection given to you by our laws,
make great gain. This is a mere police or municipal regulation. 9
Benjamin had no cause for complaint, for he could enjoy the freedoms of his con-
science even while the city imposed limits on his activities. The same reasoning
underlay Specht v. Commonwealth, in which a Seventh-Day Baptist was convicted
of unlawfully hauling manure on the Sabbath. 3 ° His claim for an exemption was
rejected, in part because of the distinction between action and belief: "So long as
no attempt is made to force upon others the adoption of the belief entertained by the
governing power, or to compel a practice in accordance with it, so long is con-
science left in the enjoyment of its natural right of individual decision and inde-
pendent religious action....' Specht's mistake, said the court, was conflating the
spheres of belief and behavior: "The error of the plaintiff's position is that it
confounds the reason of the prohibition with its actual effect, and thus mistakes the
mere restraint of physical exertion for the fetters that clog the freedom of mind and
conscience."' 3 2 The Texas Supreme Court drew the same distinction in upholding
a prohibition against selling beer on Sundays:
The right to worship God according to the dictation of the con-
science has not at all been interrupted; nor is it enjoined upon any
inhabitant of the city to attend the religious exercises of any de-
nomination; and he may decline to attend any, and amuse himself
with the metaphysical reflections and deductions of the infidel.'33
Individual autonomy thus proved fatal to claims for the expansion of constitutional
protections. Moral self-help, not judicial interference, was the order of the day.
The legal culture's commitment to Christianity, majority rule, and individual auton-
omy thus led the nineteenth-century courts to uphold Sunday laws under theories
that today would be unacceptable as First Amendment violations. Sunday laws are
still with us, but they have survived for secular reasons, not religious ones. Many
nineteenth-century courts had bolstered their Sunday opinions by pointing out that
the laws could also be justified as an exercise of the secular police power. A uni-
form day of rest was thought to be healthful and salutary. "It humanizes, by the help
129 Id.
130 8 Pa. 312, 324 (1848).
131 Id. at 324.
132 Id.
133 Gabel v. City of Houston, 29 Tex. 335, 346 (1867).
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of conversation and society, the manners of all classes, which would otherwise de-
generate into a sordid ferocity and savage selfishness of spirit."' 34 The Sunday laws
merely standardized the day of rest. Accordingly, their validity was "neither
strengthened nor weakened by the fact that the day of rest ... is the Sabbath day."'' 31
This secular rationale became increasingly prominent toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, as the ties between Christianity and the state began to fray. 36 And
in a kind of culmination, it enabled the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold Sunday clos-
ing laws on secular grounds in the mid-twentieth century. 137 By that time, the
Christian legal culture was nearly gone, but for most of the preceding century, it had
propagated a very different view of individual freedoms and the power of the state.
B. Blasphemy Laws
The nineteenth century's blasphemy prosecutions reflect the same cultural themes
as the Sunday cases. An early and influential blasphemy case was People v. Ruggles,3 8
in which a New York court upheld Ruggles' s conviction, fine, and imprisonment for
calling Jesus Christ a "bastard" and the Virgin Mary a "whore.' ' 139 The state argued
that blaspheming Christ was a common law crime, while Ruggles claimed the pro-
tection of Article 38 of the New York Constitution, which provided that "the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, should for ever thereafter be allowed within this state, to all mankind.'' 4
Ruggles maintained that the state could no more punish him for reviling Jesus and
Mary than for reviling "Mahomet or the grand Lama."14 Chancellor Kent, writing
for the court, invoked the themes of Christian culture and majority rule to reject
Ruggles's argument. The state was not required to treat Christianity like other
religions because "we are a christian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply ingrafted upon christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of those
impostors."'' 42 In light of this popular preference, said Kent, the majority were
entitled to guard Christianity against those who did not share their beliefs: "The
free, equal, and undisturbed, enjoyment of religious opinion, whatever it may be,
and free and decent discussions on any religious subject, is granted and secured; but
'3 Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 102, 111 (1853).
1 Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 391 (1853). See also Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile,
40 Ala. 725 (1867); State ex rel. Walker v. Judge of Section A, 1 So. 437 (La. 1887);
Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861); Specht v. Commonwealth,
8 Pa. 312 (1848).
136 Way, supra note 24, at 517-18.
"' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
138 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
119 Id. at 292.
140 Id. at 296.
14' id. at 295.
142 id.
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to revile, with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost
the whole community, is an abuse of that right."'' 43 As in the Sunday cases, freedom
of belief did not include the right to attack the majority's religion.
The same ideas appeared in other blasphemy cases. In Updegraph v. Common-
wealth, the defendant was convicted for calling the veracity of the Scriptures into
doubt.' 44The conviction was reversed for a defect in the indictment, 4 but the court
took pains to affirm the validity of the statute.'" The court somewhat defensively
treated the case as a referendum on the entire Christian culture: "We will first dispose
of what is considered the grand objection - the constitutionality of Christianity -
for, in effect, that is the question."'47 After a long disquisition on the religious history
of the Pennsylvanian people, the court had no difficulty concluding that "it is irre-
fragably proved, that the laws and institutions of this state are built on the foundation
of reverence for Christianity."'' 4  Part of this Christian tradition included religious
freedom and "complete liberty of conscience, 149 but such liberty did not confer the
right to act against the dominant religion: "While our own free constitution secures
liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship to all, it is not necessary to
maintain that any man should have the right publicly to vilify the religion of his
neighbors and of the country; these two privileges are directly opposed."'50 These
views reappeared a decade later in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, '' a Massachusetts
case, and State v. Chandler,5 2 a Delaware prosecution. In Kneeland, the defendant
had published a newspaper article denying the reality of God and Christ, 53 while in
Chandler, one Thomas Jefferson Chandler had taken a page out of Ruggles' s book
by calling Jesus a "bastard" and Mary a "whore."''5 4 Both courts upheld the convic-
tions against constitutional challenges, again stressing the need to safeguard the rights
of the majority. 5 Although minorities were free to hold whatever opinions they
wished, they crossed a line when they willfully disturbed Christian society. Conse-
quently, the state "may pass laws to punish those who, under the pretense of exer-
cising [freedom of conscience], shall wantonly and wickedly invade the enjoyment
of it by others."'5
I 6
143 Id.
'" Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
14 Id. at 410.
Id. at 408 ([Tlhe act against blasphemy is neither obsolete nor virtually repealed ....
"4I Id. at 400 (emphasis in original).
148 id. at 403.
149 id.
150 Id. at 408.
'.' 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838).
152 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837).
'53 Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 206-07.
154 Chandler, 2 Del. at 553.
i15 See id. at 579; Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 246.
156 Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 236.
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It is worth noting that the blasphemy cases took a broader view of these disputes
than merely minority versus majority. Also at stake was the rule of law in a free
society. The Updegraph court urged, "No free government now exists in the world,
unless where Christianity is acknowledged, and is the religion of the country."' 57
Christianity is thus "the purest system of morality," and the "only stable support of
all human laws." '158 The Chandler court agreed, pointing to respect for Christianity
as a necessary condition for the freedoms of the common law: "[The common law]
is emphatically a law for the protection of religious liberty; and no law can be truly
such which does not equally protect the public peace from insults and outrages upon
public opinion ... ,,' On this view, blasphemy laws, far from being oppressive,
were enacted during "the breaking forth of the sun of religious liberty, by those who
had suffered much for conscience' [sic] sake, and fled from ecclesiastical oppres-
sion."'" On a more quotidian level, the administration of the laws also depended on
Christianity. "In the Courts over which we preside," wrote one nineteenth-century
judge, "we daily acknowledge Christianity as the most solemn part of our administra-
tion."'' The swearing of oaths was "essential to the peace and safety of society"'62
and required "religious sanction" to be effective. 163 To attack Christianity, then, was
"to weaken the confidence in human veracity, so essential to the purposes of society."'164
While it may now seem ironic to preserve freedom by limiting dissent, the motive was
nonetheless sincere: free society itself would stand or fall with Christianity.
The blasphemy cases also relied on the distinction between the internal realm of
conscience and the external realm of behavior. The laws could be upheld because the
preservation of public order was seen as posing no threat to the exercise of individual
belief. As the Kneeland court explained, the blasphemy laws were "not intended to
prevent or restrain the formation of any opinions or the profession of any religious
sentiments whatever, but to restrain and punish acts which have a tendency to disturb
the public peace."' 65 Likewise, in Chandler, the court acknowledged that "we cannot
"' Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 406 (Pa. 1824).
'58 Id. at 407.
159 Chandler, 2 Del. at 572.
'60 Updegraph, 11 Serg. & Rawle at 407.
161 City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 523 (S.C. Ct. App.
1848).
162 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 221 (1838).
163 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
"6 Updegraph, 11 Serg. & Rawle at 407. See also Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 297-98. At least in
the first half of the century, it was common for courts to require that witnesses believe in God,
on the theory that such belief made their oaths more reliably binding on their consciences. See
Perry's Admin'r v. Stewart, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 37 (Del. Super. Ct. 1835); Commonwealth v.
Hills, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 530 (1852); Jackson, ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1820).
165 Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 221. See also Updegraph, 11 Serg. & Rawle at 408
(noting that blasphemy was prohibited "not to force conscience by punishment, but to pre-
serve the peace of the country by an outward respect to the religion of the country").
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keep the consciences of men,""6 but its approval of the defendant's conviction made
clear that men's actions could be kept without trespassing on their consciences. As
in the Sunday cases, law was thereby relieved of the duty to intervene against
majorities, and the courts saw no occasion to expand constitutional rights to protect
blasphemers.
The blasphemy cases further illustrate the major themes of nineteenth-century
rights law and show how greatly the resulting vision of rights differs from that to which
we are accustomed. It is now virtually inconceivable that a blasphemy conviction could
stand. Modem courts would likely reverse it either as a violation of free speech or
a violation of the Establishment Clause.'67 Moreover, the line between belief and
behavior has been greatly eroded in First Amendment law, which means that limits
on religiously motivated conduct are now more readily treated as forbidden limits
on freedom of religion. 168 The fact that no such things were contemplated in the
nineteenth-century cases is a measure of the century's commitment to both the
Protestant culture and a different vision of individual rights. The courts were bound
by the letter of the law, but they were not bound to upset the careful balance between
majority and minority rights by upsetting cultural norms or by expanding existing
concepts of liberty.
C. Religion in the Public Schools
The public schools were a third focal point for litigation over individual rights
in the Christian culture, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Much
of this controversy reflected rising tensions between Catholics and Protestants over
matters such as the recognition of Catholic holidays and the use of the Protestant
King James Bible in school exercises. 169 Like the Sunday laws and blasphemy cases,
the school cases turned on the themes of Protestant culture, majority rights, and
personal autonomy.
"6 State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 575 (1837).
167 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing a breach-of-peace
conviction for speech denigrating Catholicism and religion in general); State v. West, 263
A.2d 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (declaring a Maryland blasphemy statute unconstitutional
on both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise grounds). The federal First Amendment has
been applied against the states since the 1930s. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931).
168 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(overturning a law prohibiting religious animal sacrifice); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978) (overturning a law barring clergy from holding public office); Sherbert v. Vemner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (finding a Free Exercise violation where the state denied unemployment
benefits based on a religiously-motivated refusal to work). But see Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (applying minimal scrutiny to a law of general applicability
having only an incidental effect on the free exercise of religion).
169 On the roots of Catholic-Protestant conflict over the public schools, see BILLINGTON,
supra note 16, at 142-59.
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Majoritarian themes ran strongly through the school cases. As in the Sunday and
blasphemy cases, the courts were committed to defending the role of Christianity in
public life against those who wished to separate the two. "Christianity," declared the
Texas Supreme Court, "is so interwoven with the web and woof of the state govern-
ment that to sustain the contention that the Constitution prohibits reading the Bible,
offering prayers, or singing songs of a religious character in any public building of
the government would produce a condition bordering upon moral anarchy."' 7
Another courtjustified school prayer with a history lesson in the Christian influence:
[S]ince the admission of this state into the Union, a period of more
than half a century, the practice has obtained in all the state in-
stitutions of learning of not only reading from the Bible in the
presence of the students, but of offering prayer; ... the text-books
used in the public schools of the state have contained extracts
from the Bible, and numerous references to Almighty God and his
attributes; and all this without objection from any source. 17 1
The Christian consensus held that "[t]he noblest ideals of moral character are found
in the Bible," and "[t]o emulate these is the supreme conception of citizenship.' 7
That being so, how could the Bible be excluded from the schools where civic values
were to be encouraged? So deep was the presumption of Christianity that one court
allowed the Bible to be used in schools because it was not "sectarian," even in its King
James translation. 73 Protestantism was not a "sect," but the baseline of American
culture.
Such a central institution was not to be excluded from the public schools based
on the wishes of a few. An 1854 Maine case, Donahoe v. Richards,174 typifies the
courts' distaste for minority challenges. The school board of the town of Ellsworth
had required the reading of the King James Bible in classroom exercises.7 5 Bridget
Donahoe, a Catholic schoolgirl, believed that the King James translation was in-
accurate and that reading it was a sin. 76 She refused to do the required reading and
170 Church v. Bullock, 109 S.W. 115, 118 (Tex. 1908).
17, Pfeiffer v. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.W. 250,252 (Mich. 1898) (rejecting a challenge to Bible-
reading in classrooms).
172 Billard v. Bd. of Educ., 76 P. 422, 423 (Kan. 1904) (upholding the reading of the
Lord's Prayer and the 23rd Psalm in school).
17' Hackett v. Brooksville Graded Sch. Dist., 87 S.W. 792, 793-94 (Ky. 1905). The court
sustained a Bible reading against a challenge that it promoted "sectarian" instruction in vio-
lation of statutory and constitutional law. Hackett, 87 S.W. 792.
174 38 Me. 379 (1854).
175 Id.
176 id.
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was expelled.' 7 Donahoe then brought suit, relying on the provision of the Maine
constitution that "no one shall be hurt, molested or restrained in his person, liberty
or estatefor worshiping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates
of his own conscience, nor for his religious professions or sentiments.""'8 Donahoe's
assertion of her rights of conscience set up a conflict between her beliefs and the
beliefs of the majority. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Appleton summarized:
"The claim, on the part of the plaintiff, is that each and every scholar may set up its
own conscience as over and above the law. It is the claim of an exemption from a
general law because it may conflict with the particular conscience." 179 As Appleton's
tone suggests, such a claim did not evoke sympathy, and Donahoe lost her case. The
court pointedly refused "to subordinate the state to the individual conscience,"'' 8 for
if conscience could trump state action, "then power ceases to reside in majorities,
and is transferred to minorities." 181
Other school cases show a similar unwillingness to allow minorities to interfere
with majority rule. In Ferriter v. Tyler, a school board expelled 150 Catholic students
for skipping school at the direction of their parish priest to attend church on the Feast
of Corpus Christi. 182 The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the expulsions, affirming
the power of the majority to set limits on the actions of minorities: "[W]hile the indi-
vidual may hold the utmost of his religious faith, and all his ideas, notions, and pre-
ferences as to religious worship and practice, he holds them in reasonable subserv-
iency to the equal rights of others, and to the paramount interests of the public .... ,,83
And in a Texas case, rejecting a challenge by Jewish and Catholic parents to Bible-
reading, hymn-singing, and prayer in the schools, the state supreme court fretted that
to allow minority preferences to control "would be to starve the moral and spiritual
natures of the many out of deference to the few. ' 'l 84 In this context, as in the others
we have seen, minority claims of right were not to be used as a means of upsetting
majority desires.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 402 (emphasis in original).
179 Id. at 408.
180 Id. at 410.
181 Id. at 409. Bridget's father, in addition to sponsoring the lawsuit, had sent the state a bill
for the costs of home-schooling Bridget after her expulsion. See BILLINGTON, supra note 16,
at 293-94. The case was so divisive that it brought violent mobs to the streets of Ellsworth.
Id. at 294.
182 48 Vt. 444 (1876).
183 Id. at 467.
14 Church v. Bullock, 109 S.W. 115, 118 (Tex. 1908) (rejecting a challenge to Bible-
reading in schools). See also Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417, 422 (Boston,
Mass., Police Ct. 1859) (rejecting conscience-based challenge to the recitation of the Ten
Commandments in schools to prevent education being "taken from the State government and
placed in the hands of a few children").
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While the school cases were extremely deferential to Protestant majorities, it bears
repeating that majorities were never wholly unrestrained. The courts were not in the
business of recognizing unwritten liberties, nor were they in the business of nullifying
what was written. Express protections against state regulation would be enforced
according to their letter, though the letter of the law was often read less expansively
than our twentieth-century sensibilities would require. In Donahoe, the court made
a point of noting that the state constitution was designed "to prevent pains and pen-
alties, imprisonment or the deprivation of social or political rights, being imposed
as a penalty for religious professions and opinions."' 5 Likewise, the Michigan court
in Pfeiffer reiterated that the state constitution was meant "to exclude religious tests,
and to place all citizens on an equality before the law as to the exercise of the fran-
chise of voting or holding office."' 8' 6 There were limits beyond which the state could
not go, but as these examples suggest, they tended to be phrased in terms of freedom
in one's person, property, or civil status from religious disadvantage.' 7 In other
words, they tended to focus on the kinds of bodily, material, or political impositions
that were the proper domain of the law, rather than on matters of internal belief,
which were foreign to law's empire. In the school cases, as in the Sunday and blas-
phemy cases, one can see the disinclination of the courts to stretch the meaning of
religious disadvantage to cover instances not enumerated or commonly understood
within the constitutional framework.
Such literalness, if one might call it that, was a direct outgrowth of the century's
view of individual autonomy, and the resulting distinction between belief and action.
If people had the capacity to form and hold their own moral beliefs, then the courts did
not need to change the law to protect them. The theme of moral autonomy was as
prominent in the school cases as it was in other cases of conscience. One of the keys
to Donahoe was the argument that nothing about reading the King James Bible
required Donahoe to give up her Catholicism:
[R]eading the bible is no more an interference with religious be-
lief, than would reading the mythology of Greece or Rome be re-
garded as interfering with religious belief or an affirmance of the
185 Donahoe, 38 Me. at 403.
186 Pfeiffer v. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.W. 250, 251 (Mich. 1898).
187 Maryland's constitution is an example of the express protection of bodily and material
interests: "[N]o person ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate on account
of his religious persuasion or profession .... MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights,
art. 36. For similar language, see GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 6; ME. CONST. of 1819, art.
I, § 3; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. II; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 1, art. V. The Arkansas
Constitution is an example of the express protection of civil status: "[T]he civil rights, privi-
leges or capacities of any citizen shall in no wise be diminished or enlarged on account of
his religion." ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 4. See also IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 4;
Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 4; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 4.
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pagan creeds.... No one was required to believe or punished for
disbelief, either in [the Bible's] inspiration or want of inspiration;
in the fidelity of the translation or its inaccuracy - or in any set
of doctrines deducible or not deducible therefrom.'88
Donahoe was free not only to believe as she wished, but she was also free to make
the moral choice between defying the law or complying with it: "When a conflict
arises, as it may, between the requirements of law and the obligations of conscience,
each man must determine his course of action according to his views of duty and of
right. ' 189 The same responsibility was laid upon schoolgirls. Moral autonomy sep-
arated the realm of belief from the realm of behavior, and moral autonomy enabled
the dissenter to decide for herself what should be Caesar's and what should be God's.
It was not the job of the law to ease such conflicts.
Other school cases reflected this theme. The Vermont court in Ferriter flatly re-
jected the notion that the expulsion of the Catholic students had interfered in any
way with their rights of conscience:
[T]he action of the [school district] touches not nor affects the
worship of Almighty God by the orators, whether such worship
be one way or another, or not at all; nor does it touch or affect
their religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship;
nor does it in any manner interfere with or control the rights of
conscience in the free exercise of religious worship. That article
in the constitution looks only to the personal conscience of the in-
dividual, as related to his personal worship of Almighty God. It
looks only to the personal relation of the individual to his God,
both as to belief and worship, and not to the relation that the indi-
vidual may sustain to others in respect to their belief and worship.
The [action of the school district] ... did not touch the belief of
the orators as to the character of that day, nor did it touch or
control the free exercise by them of religious worship according
to their belief and conscience .... 90
The Board's actions could be upheld because, despite being expelled, the students
remained free to believe whatever religious doctrine they wished. For the same
reasons, a Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v. Cooke upheld the beating of a
schoolchild for refusing, on the instructions of his priest and his father, to recite the
188 Donahoe, 38 Me. at 399. This passage was quoted and relied upon in Pfeiffer, 77 N.W.
at 253, in which the Michigan Supreme Court rejected a father's challenge to Bible reading
in the Detroit public schools. See 77 N.W. 250.
189 Donahoe, 38 Me. at 412.
'9' Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 460 (1876).
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Ten Commandments.' 9 ' The school's requirement was not forbidden because it did
not prevent the child from believing as he wished: "[N]o scholar is requested to
believe [the Bible], none to receive it as the only true version of the laws of God....
To read the Bible in school ... is no interference with religious liberty."' 92 The
same distinction between external action and internal belief was used in Spiller v.
Inhabitants of Woburn to uphold the expulsion of a student who refused to bow her
head during school prayer. 93 The court acknowledged that requiring students to join
in "any religious rite or observance... contrary to their religious convictions" would
be unconstitutional, but it determined this was not such a case."9 The requirement
of bowing one's head "did not prescribe an act which was necessarily one of devotion
or religious ceremony."' 195 Instead,
[i]t went no further than to require the observance of quiet and
decorum during the religious service with which the school was
opened. It did not compel a pupil to join in the prayer, but only to
assume an attitude which was calculated to prevent interruption by
avoiding all communication with others during the service.'96
Here, too, external restraints on behavior were seen as distinct from matters of in-
ternal belief.
The nineteenth-century view of autonomy can be more fully appreciated by con-
trasting it with the modern approach. The 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case of Lee v.
Weisman'97 is the polar opposite of Spiller and its ilk. In Lee, the Court declared un-
constitutional the use of nonsectarian invocation and benediction prayers at a public-
school graduation ceremony. 9 The Court relied on its perception that the state spon-
sorship of the prayer "places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending
students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invo-
cation and benediction."'" A failure to participate could result in the student's being
noticed or singled out, which left non-religious students "in the dilemma of partici-
pating, with all that implies, or protesting.'' It was no answer for the Lee Court,
as it was for the Spiller court and others, that outward participation does not imply
internal consent:
'91 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Boston, Mass., Police Ct. 1859). The eleven-year-old was beaten
on his hands "with a rattan stick, some three feet in length, and three-eighths of an inch thick."
Id. at 419. The beating went on intermittently for thirty minutes. Id.
192 Id. at 423.
193 94 Mass. (12 Alien) 127 (1866).
'94 Id. at 129.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 593.
200 Id.
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It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told that for her the
act of standing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect,
rather than participation. What matters is that, given our social
conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe
that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval
of it.210
By putting the dissenter to the choice of acquiescence or rebellion, the school caused
the student "embarrassment," "intrusion," and a "sense of isolation and affront," forms
of psychic hurt which were sufficient to invalidate the state's action. 2
The nineteenth-century answer to Lee would have been that the student's auton-
omous conscience remained free, whatever her feelings or outward behaviors. As
the court had written in Ferriter over one hundred years earlier, "It would seem to
be trifling with a momentous subject, to claim that [the Constitution] was designed
to prohibit the Legislature from enacting any law ... which might interfere with the
wishes, and tastes, and feelings of any of the citizens in the matter of religion. 2 3
In the modem age, however, the burden of safeguarding conscience has shifted from
the individual to the courts. Hence, the Court's ahistorical conclusion in Lee: "One
timeless lesson is that if citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises,
the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable con-
science and belief which is the mark of a free people."2" This was an accurate state-
ment of twentieth-century attitudes, but for the nineteenth century, the burden of
maintaining conscience in the face of majority opposition lay with the individual,
not with the law.
Eventually, the strength of the Christian culture began to wane in the school cases
just as it had in the Sunday laws and blasphemy cases. In the late nineteenth century,
and into the twentieth, state courts became more willing to disallow Bible readings and
other forms of prayer in schools.0 5 The U.S. Supreme Court put the matter more or
less to rest in the 1960s with its decisions in Engel v. Vitale2 6 and Abington School
District v. Schempp,2°7 overturning prayer and religiously-motivated Bible reading
in public schools. These cases, like Lee, further illustrate the divide between the
rights law of the twentieth century and that of the nineteenth. In language that
would have been almost inconceivable a century before, the Schempp Court turned
the tables on majorities by subordinating them to the interests of the few:
201 Id.
202 Id. at 594.
203 Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 465 (1876).
204 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
20 See People ex rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910); Herold v. Parish Bd.
of Sch. Dirs., 68 So. 116 (La. 1915); State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 91 N.W. 846 (Neb.
1902); State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd., 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890); see also Way, supra note
24, at 520-21.
206 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
207 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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[W]e cannot accept that [our holding] ... collides with the major-
ity's right to free exercise of religion. While the Free Exercise
Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights
of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could
use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.208
The long reign of the Christian legal culture was coming to an end.
CONCLUSION: CULTURE AND THE ROLE OF LAW
The nineteenth century's approach to individual rights was far different from that
of our own time. As we have seen, it is inaccurate to say that nineteenth-century law
was unconcerned with individual rights. It is accurate, however, to say that it saw a
much smaller role for law in mediating between majority rule and minority claims of
conscience. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of religion and freedom
of conscience were taken seriously and were enforced. But they were typically not
expanded beyond the narrow confines of their text or the common understanding of
their scope. It would be left to a later era to begin the project of discovering un-
written rights in constitutional provisions touching personal freedoms. And it would
be for the next century's lawyers and judges to compress belief and behavior into an
interest in personal autonomy that must be protected by law. For most of the nine-
teenth century, freedom inhered in the right of the Christian majority to build a
society according to its lights, and freedom inhered in the moral autonomy of dis-
senters, even when constrained in their actions by the majority's rules. To modem
eyes the law's deference to majorities may seem like a way to limit the exercise of
personal freedoms. To the nineteenth century, however, that distinction was the
appropriate way to honor both the right of the majority to propagate its culture and
the freedom of dissenters to act as the morally autonomous beings that they were.
Near the end of the nineteenth century, all of this began to change. Immigration,
industrialization, urbanization, and other social trends began to weaken the place of
Protestant Christianity as the dominant social institution.29 The passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the rise of substantive due process largely federalized
the law of individual rights. Throughout the twentieth century, in cases involving free
speech, abortion, sexual liberty, and church-state relations, the Supreme Court has
departed from nineteenth-century attitudes by invoking principles of conscience and
autonomy to restrain majority-driven state action. As cases like Lee and Casey sug-
gest, the nineteenth-century vision of personal liberty has been replaced with a sort
of welfare state of conscience, in which law has become a leading tool for defining
and safeguarding individual autonomy. While the result has been an expanding
roster of constitutionally protected rights, one might wonder whether this has come
at some cost to the notion of moral independence and self-reliance. But that is a
story for another day.
208 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225-26 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
209 HANDY, supra note 15, at 65; MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRImS IN THEIR OwN LAND: 500
YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 297-317 (1984).
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